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Kant and Respect 
Abstract
Kant considers that the ground of duty, the moral law has its source a priori in our 
rational natures and is not based on our empirical knowledge of human beings. I claim 
that he is also pointing to certain features that are necessary to presuppose about 
human beings for the moral law to be applicable. Respect is one of these features that 
both allows for the recognition of any duty and provides an explanation of how the 
moral law can motivate in the human case. ‘Respect’ is also used in a narrower sense 







Motivation and Respect 
Respect 
Respect necessary for the recognition of any duties 









Kant’s Account of Respect: A bridge between rationality and anthropology 
 
 A priori and A posteriori aspects of Kant’s Ethics 
 
Kant starts the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals by emphasising the 
importance of separating the a priori or rational part of moral philosophy from the a 
posteriori or empirical aspects. Indeed, he reserves the term ‘moral philosophy’ for 
the rational part. He writes “…ethics …the empirical part might be given the special 
title practical anthropology, the term moral philosophy being properly used to refer 
just to the rational part.”1 Throughout his writings in both theoretical and practical 
philosophy the distinction between what is a priori and what is a posteriori is given 
paramount importance. We need to separate that which has its source a priori from its 
application to, for example human beings.  
Furthermore, the whole of moral philosophy is based entirely on the part of it 
that is non-empirical, i.e. pure. When applied to man, it does not borrow in the 
slightest from our knowledge of human beings (i.e. from anthropology). 
Rather it prescribes to man, as a rational being laws a priori.2   
 
The source of duty then, or what Kant calls the moral law, lies in our rational natures. 
The moral law is formulated in the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative as, 
“Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should 
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become a universal law.” 3 It is the moral law that is the object of respect and for Kant 
this is what is meant by respect for persons. “All respect for a person is actually only 
respect for the law (of righteousness, etc.,) that that person exemplifies.”4  The respect 
then is both for the moral law in us and also in other persons. Respect then is not just 
about our relationship with other people since we owe respect to ourselves as well. It 
is in virtue of our rationality or, as Kant refers to this, our humanity, that we are 
objects of respect. 
 
Recently, there have been contemporary accounts of Kant’s writings that have 
concentrated on what he has had to say about anthropology.5  Indeed, Nancy Sherman 
comments on “the growing reorientation of Kantian moral philosophy toward the 
human case and toward the interface of the rational ground of morality with our 
affective natures.”6 What I hope to show in this paper is that in all his uses of ‘respect’ 
Kant is pointing to a priori features in man that are necessary for moral philosophy to 
be applied to man. Although Kant claims that “the whole of moral philosophy is 
based entirely on the part of it that is non-empirical…”, the centrality of my thesis is 
the claim that the account of respect explains how this moral philosophy can be valid 
for human beings.  To be applicable it presupposes certain claims about human 
beings. I will show that Kant’s account has implications for what must be assumed 
about rational finite beings if they are to be both aware of duties and be motivated by 
the moral law. In this sense respect provides a bridge between moral philosophy and 
practical anthropology since it is pointing to necessary features that must be 
presupposed in human beings for the application of the moral law.  By ‘application’ I 
shall be referring to three roles for respect in “the interface of the rational ground of 
morality with our affective natures”. First, whilst Kant does not deviate from the 
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position that it is the moral law alone that motivates, without his account of respect 
we would not have an explanation at the phenomenal level of how it could motivate in 
the human case. Second, the account of respect indicates what must be presupposed 
about human beings in order that they are able to be aware of any duties that have 
their origin in our rational natures. It is also what has to be presupposed for the 
recognition of specific duties that Kant attributes to respect as opposed to love. These 
are the duties that are owed to others and Kant claims that it is necessary to 
presuppose the feeling of respect in the human case to be aware of these duties. 
 
The second thesis of the paper, that is an implication of the first thesis, is the claim 
that there is not a single account of respect, Achtung, in Kant’s writings. Rather there 
is a broad account of respect that covers any duties and a narrower meaning when a 
specific range of duties are being considered. In each case there is a corresponding 
account of what features must be presupposed in our phenomenal natures in order for 
respect to perform the function allocated to it. I propose to call the first ‘respect (B)’ 




There are four different contexts in which Kant discusses respect (Achtung). 
 
1. Respect “as a subjective motive of activity, as a drive to obey the law and as 
the ground of maxims of a course of life conformable to the law.”7 This 
feature is also discussed in the Groundwork and I shall claim that in this 
context he intends respect (B). 
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2. Respect is isolated as being one of the necessary feelings that is presupposed 
for a human being to recognise something as a duty.8 In this context, Kant uses 
the Latin equivalent reverentia, reverence, respect, fear or awe. I shall argue 
that this feeling is respect (N) and is what is presupposed for the specific 
duties flowing from respect. Moral feeling is also isolated in this section of the 
Metaphysics of Morals as being a necessary presupposition for the recognition 
of any duty in man and I shall claim that this is synonymous with respect (B). 
3. Within the duties of virtue to others, there are those arising from love and 
those arising from respect. Of the latter Kant writes respect “is therefore 
recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other human beings, that is, of a worth 
that has no price, no equivalent for which the object evaluated (aestimii) could 
be exchanged.”9 In this context, Kant uses the Latin equivalent observantia 
aliis praestanda, the respect due to others. Here he is discussing, I shall claim, 
respect (N). 
4. Within the duties arising from love, respect also figures in the discussion of 
gratitude. Kant writes, “Gratitude consists in honouring a person because of a 
benefit he has rendered us. The feeling connected with this judgment is respect 
for the benefactor (who puts one under obligation), whereas the benefactor is 
viewed as only in a relation of love toward the recipient.”10 This is also respect 
(N). 
 
I shall argue that the use described in (1) above is where Kant is describing the 
phenomenal mechanism that accompanies the motive of duty. In this case it reflects 
the motive of duty but its occurrence is because we are considering duty in 
combination with beings who have phenomenal natures. 
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I shall claim that in connection with point (2), Kant is arguing that there are  
necessary features that we must presuppose about human beings per se for the moral 
law to have an effect. They are analogous to the a priori features that he isolates in the 
Critique of Pure Reason that attach to the a posteriori components of knowledge 
discussed in the Anticipations of Perception and the Axioms of Intuition. In other 
words, although a priori it is about what it is necessary to presuppose for the moral 
law to have an effect on our phenomenal natures and not an attribute of the moral law 
per se. 
 
The specific duties arising from respect in (3) above are based on not infringing the 
humanity possessed by others. These are negative duties since they are about what we 
ought not to do to any person and are not based on any specific, contingent features 
that certain individuals might happen to possess.   
 
This point is further made in point (4) above where respect is accorded to a benefactor 
in recognition of their performance of a duty that is required by rational natures, 
namely, the duty to seek other people’s happiness. This though is unlike the duties 
described in (3) above since gratitude is a positive duty that is owed to a benefactor. 
 
Both the duties described in (3) and (4) result from applying the moral law to the 
human case. Since we are finite beings who are dependent on each other for  
assistance, the moral law prescribes duties of non-interference and assistance.    
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Therefore, there does seem to be a more intimate connection between the pure moral 
philosophy that Kant distinguishes from our knowledge of human beings than Kant 
suggests in the quotation from the Groundwork at the start of this paper. The a priori 
features of morality when applied to man have also to take into account the sort of 
creatures that we are. Respect plays a crucial role in this as I shall show below. If this 
account is correct, to respect persons is explained by understanding the interaction of 
pure moral philosophy with general features about human beings. 
 
Respect as the moral incentive 
 
My claim here is that in this context Kant’s account of respect is to be understood as 
an explanation at the phenomenal level of what it is for the moral law to “directly 
determine the will.”11 The most detailed discussion of this aspect of respect occurs in 
Kant’s discussion the “Of the Drives of Practical Reason” in the Critique of Practical 
Reason.12 I shall start then by considering what Kant says about the moral incentive 
both there and at those sections in the Groundwork that also address this problem. My 
first claim will be that Kant regards respect as a motive, “as a subjective motive of 
activity, as a drive to obey the law and as the ground of maxims of a course of life 
conformable to the law.”13   
 
Kant starts this section in the Critique of Practical Reason with the claim, “What is 
essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law should directly determine 
the will.”14 In making this claim his initial purpose is to draw the distinction, familiar 
from the Groundwork, between actions that are merely in accord with the moral law 
and those where the moral law directly determines the will. It is only the latter that 
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have moral worth. The question that Kant is addressing in this section is to give an 
account of the moral law as a moral “drive… and to see what happens to the human 
faculty of desire as a consequence of this motive.”15   
 
A drive is defined by Kant as “a subjective determining ground of a will whose reason 
does not by its nature necessarily conform to the objective law.”16  Thus, drives are 
only possessed by humans and not by divine wills since they are attributes of beings 
in whom the moral law does not automatically determine the will. By describing these 
as “subjective”, I take Kant to be making the point that they are objects of experience 
and belong therefore to the phenomenal world. Drives are possessed by beings who 
have, in the language of the Groundwork17, selves that can be viewed both 
phenomenally and intelligibly.  
 
What then is the “drive” of the moral law or, the question that Kant takes as 
synonymous, “what happens to the human faculty of desire as a consequence of this 
motive”?18  Kant’s reply is that respect for the moral law is the moral drive19 and his 
account of respect is thus designed to explain how the moral law can become the 
drive. The account of respect then provides an explanation of how the moral law can 
be a motive. Kant writes, “Thus the moral law… is also a subjective motive. That is, it 
is the drive to this action, since it has an influence on the sensuousness of the subject 
and effects a feeling which promotes the influence of the law on the will.”20   
 
The last part of this quotation requires elaboration. What does it mean to say that this 
feeling “promotes the influence of the law on the will”? In order to understand this we 
need to see what Kant says about the relationship between drives, interests and 
 9
Kant and Respect 
maxims. Kant claims that from the concept of “drive” there comes the concept of 
“interest” which, “ indicates a drive of the will so far as it is presented by reason.”21  I 
assume here that he means that interests are rationally stated versions of the original 
drives since, as he writes in the Groundwork, “Interest is that by which reason 
becomes practical, i.e., a cause determining the will. Therefore one says of rational 
beings only that they take an interest in something; non-rational creatures feel only 
sensuous impulses.”22  Maxims, or subjective principles of action,23 in turn, rest on 
these interests. Kant then writes, “A maxim is thus morally genuine only when it rests 
on exclusive interest in obedience to the law. All three concepts – of drive, interest 
and maxim – can, however, be applied only to finite beings.”24 This quotation then 
excludes divine wills (as was noted above) and the former quotation from the 
Groundwork excluded non-rational creatures. This respect for the moral law is what 
Kant describes as the “moral drive” and this produces an “interest” in rational finite 
beings that is the basis for a maxim of action.25   
 
If respect is a motive, we now need to look at precisely what Kant says about the 
composition of this motive. In particular, since he describes it, at least partially, as a 
feeling, how is this compatible with the contrast that he draws at the beginning of the 
Groundwork between the motive of duty and actions that result from immediate or 
mediate inclinations?  
 




Kant and Respect 
(1) a feeling because in thwarting all inclination that might be contrary to 
morality it is thwarting feelings. This is because all inclinations, according to 
Kant, are based on feelings and a negative effect on feeling is itself a feeling. 
This feeling: 
(a) “…is a feeling produced by an intellectual cause”26   
(b) “…is the only feeling that we can know completely a priori” 27
( c) consists of: 
(i) a feeling of pain which arises when our inclinations are 
thwarted. This is described by Kant as the negative effect on 
feeling.  He also describes this as humiliation (intellectual 
contempt).28   
(ii) A positive feeling is generated by the removal of the resistance 
of our inclinations. Kant writes, “respect for the law is thus by 
virtue of its intellectual cause a positive feeling that can be 
known a priori , for any diminution of obstacles to an activity 
furthers this activity itself.”29  
(2) the cognitive state of consciousness of the moral law. He writes,  “The 
immediate determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness thereof, 
is called respect…” 30
 
In this section of the Critique of Practical Reason Kant explicitly states that both 
components are involved in respect. He writes, “The consciousness of free submission 
of the will to the law, combined with an inevitable constraint imposed only by our 
own reason on all inclinations, is respect for the law.”31 Other writers32 have claimed 
that there are both this affective and cognitive aspect in Kant’s account of respect and 
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this view is supported by the above quotations. I shall return later to the relation 
between these two aspects. 
 
If we start with the composition of the feeling described in (c ) (i) and (ii) above 
where Kant describes respect as both a feeling of pain if our inclinations are thwarted 
and at the same time as a positive feeling, then this conforms to the account that he 
gives of choice. Kant writes, “Every determination of choice proceeds from the 
representation of a possible action to the deed through the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure, taking an interest in the action or its effect.”33  Both these elements are in 
the feeling of respect that Kant describes. However, it must be remembered that, as 
described above, the practical choice is an act of will whereby we act on maxims. 
Kant states this point succinctly in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
where he writes,  
…that freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar 
to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so far 
as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it into a 
universal rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself); 
only in this way can an incentive, whatever it may be, coexist with the 
absolute spontaneity of the power of choice (of freedom).34   
 
Therefore, all choice is represented as a practical activity whether the maxims are 
based on interests that have moral worth or not.35 The contrast to be drawn then is not 
between the passivity of certain interests that are based on sensations and the activity 
involved in moral interests since to act on either involves a practical activity of 
reason. The contrast is rather to be explained in the causal account that Kant gives of 
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the origination of the feeling of respect in contrast to the origination of other feelings. 
In point 1(a) above he describes the cause of the feeling of respect as being an 
intellectual one. As such it is not a possible object of experience.  
 
This feeling of respect is produced by an intellectual cause and is the only feeling that 
we can know a priori. Now because it is produced by an intellectual cause, we cannot 
be aware of this cause as an item of experience. In this way we have a contrast 
between moral feeling and pathological feeling because the cause of these latter 
feelings lies in emotions and passions that are the objects of experience.  In the case 
of the first point36, Kant distinguishes between a pathological interest and a practical 
interest. Interests, as mentioned earlier, are only found in rational finite beings that 
excludes divine wills or non-rational animals. Pathological interests are dependent on 
sensations that are represented in our inclinations for certain objects. Practical 
interest, by contrast, is based on principles of reason alone. As Kant makes clear in 
the Critique of Practical Reason,  
Respect, in contrast to the enjoyment or gratification of happiness, is 
something for which there can be no feeling basic and prior to reason, for such 
a feeling would always be sensuous and pathological. Respect as the 
consciousness of the direct constraint of the will through law is hardly 
analogous to the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to the faculty of 
desire it produces exactly the same effect, but from different sources.37  
Pathological interests are in the object of an action that is based on our inclination. 
Reason here is just needed to supply the rule for achieving the object for which we 
have an inclination. In the case of practical interests, it is the action that interests us 
and not the object. 
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 What we have then are two sets of distinctions:  
1. a) Acting on the basis of a practical interest 
b) Acting on the basis of a pathological interest 
2. a) Account from the phenomenal point of view of respect 
b) Account from the phenomenal point of view of the causality of 
inclinations 
In the case of both 1 a) and 1 b), the act of choice, Willkür, is not an object of 
experience but described from the intelligible point of view what is causally 
determined is viewed as arising from free choice. In the case of 1 a) this Willkür is 
exercised as Wille and in the latter case the choice is exercised to achieve some object. 
Neither 1 a) nor 1 b) is an object of experience. However, this does not debar us in the 
case of 1 b) talking of the causal chain between objects that we desire and our feelings 
and this is what is described in 2 b). The same can also be ascribed to 2 a) with the 
only difference that here respect has an intellectual cause and is not something 
causally related to pre-existing sensations that we might contingently have. 
 
Understood in this way, Kant is therefore giving an account, in this section of the 
Critique of Practical Reason, of the phenomenal mechanism that accompanies the 
motive of duty. As Kant reminds us frequently, this motive of duty is not an object of 
experience. He writes in the Groundwork that “there cannot be cited a single certain 
example of the disposition to act from duty.”38     
 
Kant is providing an account of the motive for adherence to the moral law when this 
is interpreted as demanding an account from the phenomenal point of view. This point 
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is made explicitly by Kant both in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical 
Reason. In the Groundwork he writes, “ Now an action done from duty must 
altogether exclude the influence of inclination and therewith every object of the will. 
Hence there is nothing left which can determine the will except objectively the law 
and subjectively pure respect for this practical law…”39 Additionally, in the Critique 
of Practical Reason he writes, “Respect for the moral law is therefore the sole and 
undoubted moral drive…”40 The account that Kant gives of respect is the explanation 
of the motive of duty from the subjective or phenomenal point of view. Kant is not 
arguing that duty needs to be supplemented by a feeling – a feeling of respect – in 
order to motivate, but that this feeling is the expression of duty from the phenomenal 
point of view. Just as in the non-moral case the freedom of choice that is attributable 
to our rational selves does not debar an explanation at the phenomenal level, so the 
same point applies to the motive of duty. This point is explicitly endorsed by Kant in 
the section on the Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason in the 
Critique of Practical Reason. Kant writes,  
…one and the same acting being as appearance…has a causality in the 
sensible world always in accord with the mechanism of nature; while with 
respect to the same event, as far as the acting person regards himself as 
noumenon …, he can contain a determining ground of that causality which 
holds under natural laws, and this determining ground of natural causality 
itself is free from every natural law.41
 
More needs to be said though about how exactly respect is the explanation, at the 
phenomenal level, of how the moral law should directly determine the will.   I have 
already claimed that respect has both an affective element and a cognitive element 
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and that the element of feeling should not be viewed as un-Kantian in anyway since 
moral feeling is to be distinguished from pathological feeling. Andrews Reath also 
claims that respect has both an intellectual and affective aspect and argues that “it is 
the intellectual aspect which is active in motivating moral conduct, while the affective 
side, or feeling of respect, is its effect on certain sensible tendencies… ”42   
 
Since Kant views both these elements as being combined in the single concept that he 
describes as ‘respect’, it is difficult to claim that only one or the other aspect is 
responsible for the motivational element in respect. Also, as I noted above, Kant’s 
view about the determination of choice being dependent on feelings of pleasure and 
pain indicate the necessary inclusion of this aspect of respect. However, if both are 
involved, what exactly is the relation between the cognitive and affective aspects?  
 
I will claim that Kant considers that this relation between the cognitive and affective 
aspect is a necessary one and not one that is contingently causal. We have already 
seen at 1(b) that Kant claims that it is a feeling that is a priori. I am claiming that the 
relationship is necessary because the generation of this feeling is a necessary 
consequence of consciousness of the moral law for Kant. Kant writes,  
The feeling which arises from the consciousness of this constraint is not 
pathological, as are those caused by objects of the senses, but practical…it 
contains, therefore, no pleasures but rather displeasure proportionate to this 
constraint. On the other hand, since this constraint is exercised only through 
the legislation of one’s own reason, it also contains something elevating,…43  
This feeling necessarily accompanies the consciousness of the moral law and can 
indeed, as Stratton-Lake suggests, be regarded “not as the effect of our consciousness 
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of the moral law, but as the way in which we are so conscious.”44 Indeed Kant states 
this point explicitly in the Metaphysics of Morals where he writes, “Respect for the 
law, which in its subjective aspect is called moral feeling, is identical with 
consciousness of one’s duty.”45  Where Stratton-Lake is wrong is to equate this 
feeling with the respect that Kant describes as reverentia, since, as I shall argue 
below, this feeling is just connected with the specific duties of respect and hence is 
respect (N). 
 
 I am not claiming that Kant considers that respect is “the original motive for 
adherence to the law”. The original motive is obedience to the law but the 
phenomenal counterpart of that is respect. Although, Kant describes respect as an 
effect of the moral law, this does not preclude it acting as a motive.46 Essentially, the 
prime source of confusion in the discussion here is an ambiguity in the word ‘effect’.  
However, my account is to claim that ‘respect’ is the label at the phenomenal level for 
the way in which we are conscious of the moral law. In this sense it can be both an 
effect and an incentive as is made clear by Kant when he writes, “…respect for the 
Moral Law must be regarded also as a positive but indirect effect of the law on 
feeling…we must see it as a subjective ground of activity. As an incentive for 
obedience to the law.”47 Here then it is respect as a feeling that Kant is discussing and 
he is recognising that it can be both an effect and an incentive. 
 
Andrews Reath, as I noted above, argues that it is consciousness of the moral law, 
what he describes as the intellectual aspect of respect, which is what is active in 
motivating moral conduct. He also misinterprets the sense of ‘effect’ that is operative 
when Kant describes the feeling of respect as an effect. He considers that passages 
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such as the above are just misleading on the part of Kant since Kant “must avoid a 
view which makes use of a natural desire, or disposition, that moves us toward moral 
conduct, and provides morality with its content.”48  Kant is not doing this if respect as 
a feeling is an incentive. This is not a pathological feeling but what constitutes 
consciousness of the moral law at the phenomenal level and this is why there are 
passages where Kant identifies the two. Indeed, Reath does backtrack from his 
position in some places where he writes, “…the feeling of respect is an incentive only 
in an attenuated sense. It is indeed the inner state of a subject who is moved by the 
Moral Law, but the active motivating factor is always the recognition of the Moral 
Law …The affective aspect is … an effect that occurs after, or in conjunction with, 
the determination of the will by the Moral Law.”49   
 
Respect as a subjective condition that is necessary for receptiveness to duty 
 
In this section I shall indicate the connection between Kant’s earlier remarks about 
respect (B) in both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason and his 
account in the Metaphysics of Morals. In the earlier works the account of respect 
provided an explanation at the phenomenal level of how the moral law determines the 
will. I will show how the claims made about respect (B) both connect with or are to be 
distinguished from the claims made about moral feeling, conscience, love of man and 
respect (N). 
 
In particular, in the earlier works we have seen that Kant describes respect as a 
combination of a feeling of pain and a positive feeling. In the Metaphysics of Morals 
this is captured by his discussion of moral feeling since only beings who have the 
 18
Kant and Respect 
susceptibility to feel pleasure and pain from being aware that something is consistent 
or not with our duty can have the feeling of respect (B) that is necessary to explain the 
moral drive. The cognitive state of consciousness of the moral law, I claimed earlier, 
necessarily generates the feeling aspect of respect (B) or can be equated with it. This 
consciousness is now shown to be possible for human beings in virtue of their 
possession of conscience that allows for the recognition of any duty. It therefore 
enables rational beings to have the consciousness that is necessary for respect (B). 
 
The second two feelings that Kant distinguishes here are love of man and respect (N). 
These are not specifically connected with the general remarks made about respect (B) 
as a moral drive in the two earlier works except in so far as they are connected with 
duties and, as such, will be covered by the moral drive explanation that applies to any 
duties. Love of man is a description of what needs to be presupposed for the specific 
duties arising from love and respect (N) is what is presupposed for the specific duties 
arising from what is owed to others.  
 
Kant lists four “ subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty” which 
he describes as “antecedent predisposition on the side of feeling.”50  These are moral 
feeling, conscience, love of man and respect. Kant’s point is that it makes no sense to 
talk of a duty to acquire these predispositions since it is necessary for human beings to 
have them, at least to some degree, to recognise any duties. These predispositions 
ought to be cultivated but it makes no sense to say that we ought to have them or that 
we have a duty to have them since without them we would not have the necessary 
attributes to recognise any duties whatsoever. Kant writes, “…it is by virtue of them 
that he can be put under obligation.”51  They are what make us describable as moral 
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beings since without these   to some degree we “would be morally dead; 
and…humanity would dissolve…into mere animality and be mixed irretrievably with 
the mass of other natural beings.”52 They are necessary conditions for the awareness 
of duty in man although they are not the ground of these duties and consciousness of 
them “can…only follow from consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on 
our mind.”53    
 
Moral Feeling “is the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being 
aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty.”54 It is 
important for Kant’s account to connect apprehension of duty with feelings of 
pleasure or displeasure since these feelings, at the phenomenal level or level of 
experience are what explains choice at this level as described above. Kant is not 
claiming that this moral feeling is like a moral sense that informs us of what our 
duties are in the sense of giving us our knowledge of our duties. Rather, our duties are 
still the product of pure practical reason and moral feeling is the awareness of these 
duties on our phenomenal natures explained in terms of pleasure or displeasure. 
 
Now, although Kant describes this as moral feeling his description of it as a 
“susceptibility”, a term that he uses three times in this short section, seems to suggest 
that it is not an actual feeling itself but rather a predisposition to have this feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure from consciousness of the moral law and it is this 
predisposition that is the “subjective condition of receptiveness to the concept of 
duty.” This account of moral feeling in the Metaphysics of Morals makes explicit 
what is a required attribute of human beings for them to be susceptible to the 
subjective motive of respect described in the Critique of Practical Reason. It is 
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evident that we are able to have the feeling described earlier as respect (B) because 
we have part of the propensity that is necessary for this feeling, namely, the 
susceptibility to feel pleasure or pain. Since the receptiveness described when 
activated corresponds to the feeling of respect (B) when utilised to explain the moral 
drive, I think that it is a reasonable interpretation to assume that this can be described 
as the predisposition that corresponds to respect (B).  Indeed, Kant equates respect 
and moral feeling at several points. For example, “This feeling (respect), under the 
name of moral feeling, is therefore produced solely by reason.” (My parenthesis)55   
 
Conscience “is practical reason holding the human being’s duty before him for his 
acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a law.”56 It is what needs to 
be presupposed on the subjective or phenomenal side for awareness of what is our 
duty. It is what is necessary for us to recognise our duties. Kant discusses this 
predisposition later in the Metaphysics of Morals and describes conscience as “an 
internal judge; and this authority watching over the law in him is … something 
incorporated in his being.”57 Conscience is described by Kant as something within 
man originally and is not acquired. It informs man what is his duty and as Kant writes, 
“…is not directed to an object but merely to the subject (to affect moral feeling by its 
act)…” 58(6:400). The susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure, moral feeling, is 
then necessarily activated since conscience informs us of what is our duty. It therefore 
seems to be what needs to be presupposed on the side of human beings for the 
cognitive state of consciousness of the moral law that forms one of the elements of 
respect when Kant is discussing the moral incentive. Consciousness, then, like moral 
feeling is a necessary feature of our phenomenal natures that is presupposed for us to 
have consciousness of the moral law, that is described under the general heading of 
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respect (B) in the Critique of Practical Reason. The two propensities distinguished 
here under the headings of moral feeling and conscience are necessary on the 
phenomenal side for the possibility of respect (B) as a motive. 
 
The last two subjective conditions that Kant describes are actually feelings. Love of 
man is again a feeling that needs to be presupposed in some degree for the recognition 
of duties. By love Kant is not here talking of the duty we have to practical love or 
benevolence. “Love is a matter of feeling…a duty to love is an absurdity. But 
benevolence (amor benevolentiae), as conduct, can be subject to a law of duty.”59 
However, some susceptibility to “the love that is delight (amor complacentiae) is 
direct. But to have a duty to this…is a contradiction.”60 Kant seems to be linking the 
presupposition of this feeling specifically with the recognition of duties to others that 
arise from love since he also mentions that, as an empirical claim, “Beneficence is a 
duty. If someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, 
he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped.”61 However, Kant’s 
point seems to be that there must be some love of our fellow human beings in order to 
be receptive to the specific duties arising from love. As he points out, this love might 
increase if someone practices the duty of beneficence but if human beings were totally 
lacking in any of this feeling for their fellow man then the duties arising from 
beneficence would leave human beings untouched. Unlike moral feeling and 
conscience which are general requirements for the motive of respect described in the 
Critique of Practical Reason, love of man is a susceptibility that must be presupposed 
for the recognition of a certain specific set of duties: those that arise from love. 
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Respect (reverentia) is also a subjective feeling like love and is the feeling of self-
esteem. Again, Kant is not suggesting that there can be a duty of self-esteem but “he 
must have respect for the law within himself in order even to think of any duty 
whatsoever.”62 It might appear that Kant is linking this feeling with the susceptibility 
to recognise specifically duties to the self rather than to others by talking of this 
feeling of respect as being one of self-esteem. However, when he comes to the 
discussion of duties arising from respect (point 3 at the beginning of the paper), he 
explains that there are duties to others arising from respect. “The respect that I have 
for others or that another can require from me (observantia aliis praestanda) is 
therefore recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other human beings.”63As can be seen, 
Kant uses different Latin equivalences for ‘respect’ in the case when he is referring to 
a feeling and when he is referring to the maxim of the respect due to others. It is 
therefore the feeling that is presupposed in human beings when he is discussing the 
specific duties arising from respect and hence corresponds to respect (N). 
 
In summary, Kant is claiming that there are four conditions that are presupposed as 
being present in phenomenal natures that are necessary for the recognition of duties. 
The first two are more general than the latter two covering presupposed conditions 
common to all duties and the latter two reflect the feelings presupposed for the 
recognition of duties specifically attributable to firstly love and secondly respect. 
Clearly, Kant is not arguing that the source of duties lies in these predispositions. 
Kant holds consistently to the view that the source of duty lies in the moral law. Duty 
as the idea of the universality of laws is thus the source of duty. In discussing these 
four necessary presuppositions present in our phenomenal natures for the recognition 
of duties, Kant is not claiming that they provide either the ground of the validity of 
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our duties or the motivational source for the performance of duties. However, they are 
necessary for the recognition of duties. They are a priori conditions that need to be 
presupposed for moral philosophy, being properly used to refer just to the rational 
part, to be able to gain applicability to man.   
 
In highlighting the need for human beings to have the two feelings of respect and love 
in order to be able to be receptive to specific duties is one way in which Kant’s moral 
philosophy, although derived from rationality, requires for its application that human 
beings have these feelings. Although not the source of our duties, feelings have a 
necessary role to play since without them we would not be the sort of creatures that 
could recognise duties. In this sense morality requires the presence of these feelings 
on the affective side of our natures. 
 
We also, as Kant makes clear in his discussion of these four subjective conditions, 
have a duty to cultivate them. He mentions the duty to “cultivate one’s conscience”64 
and that the obligation “with regard to moral feeling can be only to cultivate it.”65 He 
also remarks that if someone practises the duty of beneficence “often and succeeds in 
realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he 
has helped.”66 This increase in the feeling of love is likely to make us aware of more 
occasions when we could help others and thus indirectly contributes to the duty of 
beneficence. 
 
Duties that we owe to others arising from respect (N) 
 
Kant divides the duties of virtue into those: 
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by performing which you also put others under obligation and duties to others 
the observance of which does not result in obligation on the part of others. -
Performing the first is meritorious (in relation to others); but performing the 
second is fulfilling a duty that is owed.- Love and respect are the feelings that 
accompany the carrying out of these duties.67    
Fulfilling duties that are owed and showing respect to others is described in negative 
terms of limiting our self-esteem. However, in discussing respect here Kant is not 
describing a feeling that we might have about our own worth as opposed to others but 
rather is referring to the duty that we have to recognise the rationality and free agency 
(humanity) of others as well as ourselves that we have a duty not to violate by 
arrogance, defamation or ridicule.  
In other words, failure to fulfil these duties of respect infringes man’s lawful claims 
and is expressed indirectly by Kant in terms of the prohibition of the opposite. 
“Arrogance …in which we demand that others think little of themselves in 
comparison with us” 68 denies respect that we owe to others since as rational agents 
we are all owed equally the same respect and demanding more respect for ourselves is 
prohibited. “Defamation…the immediate inclination, with no particular aim in view, 
to bring into the open something prejudicial to respect for others”69 (6:466) is contrary 
to the respect that we owe others in virtue of their possession of humanity. Even if 
what is said about the other person is true, the vice still remains since it is contrary to 
respect for humanity as such. Ridicule that Kant describes as “Wanton faultfinding 
and mockery, the propensity to expose others to laughter, to make their faults the 
immediate object of one’s amusement, is a kind of malice.”70 This also deprives 
others of the respect that they are owed in virtue of their humanity even if the faults 
are real. 
 25
Kant and Respect 
 
This respect then is only a negative duty about what we ought not to do if respect is 
still to be maintained. Kant is clearly not saying that the duties of respect require 
positive actions on our part such as positively showing others high esteem. It is what 
we must refrain from doing to any other person if we are to show true respect for the 
moral law. This is another important aspect of Kant’s account of respect that it 
emphasises that respect (N) is concerned with what we must not do if we are to 
respect humanity in any other person. 
 
The specific duties arising from respect (N) then apply to all persons, or, as I 
indicated at the start of the paper, the moral law. It is not dependent on any particular 
position that someone might have in society or any particular relationships. These 
duties are present whatever the character of the individual and whatever that 
individual has done. Kant writes,  
Nonetheless I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a human being; 
I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a 
human being, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it. So 
there can be disgraced punishments that dishonor humanity itself (such as 
quartering a man, having him torn by dogs, cutting off his nose and ears).71    
The duties of respect that are owed in virtue of man as a rational being and exemplar 
of the moral law are universal and cannot be denied whatever the individual has done. 
This bedrock of respect is owed to all men in virtue of their possession of humanity 
and is distinguished by Kant from respect that might be dependent on contingent 
differences between individuals and is therefore not attributable to their humanity per 
se. 
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The different forms of respect to be shown to others in accordance with 
difference in their qualities or contingent relations – differences of age, sex, 
birth, strength or weakness, or even rank and dignity,…cannot be set forth in 
detail and classified in the metaphysical first principles of a doctrine of virtue, 
since this has to do only with its pure rational principles.72  
The duties of respect then are applicable to all persons in virtue of their possession of 
rationality irrespective of any contingent details about them, including any 
wrongdoing that they might have done. 
 
Respect (N) and Gratitude 
 
As I pointed out above, the duties arising from love are not owed but do put others 
under an obligation to you. Kant is not talking about a feeling here but the maxim of 
benevolence and so if one is beneficent to someone else then that person is under an 
obligation to you or has a duty of gratitude to you.  
Gratitude consists in honouring a person because of a benefit he has rendered 
us. The feeling connected with this judgment is respect for the benefactor 
(who puts one under obligation), whereas the benefactor is viewed as only in a 
relation of love toward the recipient.73    
This is a duty and not just, for example, prudential advice about how to obtain further 
assistance. This is unlike the duties discussed in connection with respect above in two 
main respects. They were negative duties but here the duty of gratitude requires the 
positive duty that we honour our benefactor. The second difference is that this duty is 
not something that is owed to all men as such. It is only owed to the particular 
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benefactor and the degree of gratitude can vary depending on “how useful the favour 




If we accept the Kantian account that the ground of morality lies in reason alone then, 
if my argument is correct, this has implications for what must be assumed about 
rational finite beings if they are to both be aware of their duties and also to show how 
such beings can be motivated solely by the moral law. It is Kant’s analysis of 
‘respect’ that provides this account and thus provides a bridge between moral 
philosophy, understood as referring to the rational part of ethics and anthropology. 
Although Kant does not deviate from the view that the ground of morality lies in the 
moral law, for the moral law to have application to human beings it is necessary to 
presuppose certain features about our natures, without which we would be morally 
dead and the moral law would have no application to us and would not be able to 
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